Benutzer:Katach/Liste der kognitiven Verzerrungen

Eine kognitive Verzerrung ist eine Abweichung der Urteilsbildung. Die Verzerrung weicht von einem unabhängig verifizierbaren, faktenbasierten Standard ab. Die Verzerrungen sind meist empirisch bestätigte Befunde der Psychologie. Einige Verzerrungen sind möglicherweise adaptiv, andere resultieren aus unzureichenden oder falsch angewanten mentalen Mechanismen.

Verhaltensverzerrungen

Viele dieser Verzerrungen betreffen Meinungsbildung, Geschäftentscheidungen und wissenschaftliche Forschung.

• Mitläufereffekt — die Tendenz, Dinge zu tun der zu glauben, weil andere Menschen dasselbe tun oder denken. Siehe auch Gruppendenken und Herdenverhalten.
• Prävalenzfehler — Fehler bei der Interpretation von statistischer Korrelation, der durch Ignorieren der Basisrate entsteht.
• Bias blind spot — die Tendenz, seine eigenenen kognitiven Verzerrungen nicht zu kompensieren.
• Choice-supportive bias — die Tendenz, getroffene Entscheidungen positiver im Gedächtnis zu behalten als sie es waren.
• Bestätigungsfehler — die Tendenz, Informationen zu suchen oder zu interpretieren, die vorgefasste Meinungen bestätigen.
• Kongruenzeffekt — die Tendenz, Hypothesen direkt zu testen, anstatt deren mögliche Alternativen.
• Kontrasteffekt — die durch eine vorherigen Konstrast ausgelöste Veränderung einer Messung.
• Déformation professionnelle — die Tendenz, Dinge entsprechend seines Berufs oder Fachbereichs zu sehen und dabei einen allgemeineren Blickwinkel außer Acht zu lassen.
• Denominationseffekt — die Tendenz, einen bestimmten Betrag eher auszugeben, wenn er auf viele kleine statt auf wenige große Zahlungen verteilt ist.
• Distinction bias — die Tendenz, zwei Optionen ähnlicher zu bewerten, wenn sie separat betrachtet werden, anstatt gemeinsam.
• Endowment-Effekt — der wahrgenommene Wert eines Gutes ist höher, wenn man es besitzt.
• Erwartungsverzerrung — die Tendenz in der Forschung, zu einem erwarteten Resultat zu kommen.
• Fokuseffekt — die Verzerrung duch Fokus auf einen bestimmten Aspekt.
• Framing-Effekt — unterschiedliche Formate können die Wirkung ändern.
• Hyperbolisches Diskontieren — eine stärkere Präferenz, je näher der Zeitpunkt der Auszahlung liegt.
• Kontrollillusion — der irrtümliche Glaube an die Kontrolle über Ereignisse.
• Impact bias — the tendency for people to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states.
• Information bias — the tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.
• Irrational escalation — the tendency to make irrational decisions based upon rational decisions in the past or to justify actions already taken.
• Just-world phenomenon - witnesses of an "inexplicable injustice . . . will rationalize it by searching for things that the victim might have done to deserve it"
• Loss aversion — "the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it". (see also sunk cost effects and Endowment effect).
• Mere exposure effect — the tendency for people to express undue liking for things merely because they are familiar with them.
• Geldwertillusion — Nichtwahrnehmung von Inflation.
• Moral credential effect — the tendency of a track record of non-prejudice to increase subsequent prejudice.
• Need for Closure — the need to reach a verdict in important matters; to have an answer and to escape the feeling of doubt and uncertainty. The personal context (time or social pressure) might increase this bias.
• Neglect of probability — the tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty.
• Not invented here — die Nichtbeachtung von bereits existierendem Wissen durch Unternehmen oder Institutionen aufgrund des Entstehungsortes.
• Omission bias — the tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful omissions (inactions).
• Outcome bias — the tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the quality of the decision at the time it was made.
• Planning fallacy — the tendency to underestimate task-completion times.
• Post-purchase rationalization — the tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a purchase was a good value.
• Pseudocertainty effect — the tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.
• Reactance — the urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice.
• Restraint bias - the tendency to overestimate one's ability to show restraint in the face of temptation.
• Selective perception — the tendency for expectations to affect perception.
• Semmelweis reflex — the tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts an established paradigm.
• Status quo bias — the tendency for people to like things to stay relatively the same (see also loss aversion, endowment effect, and system justification).
• Von Restorff effect — the tendency for an item that "stands out like a sore thumb" to be more likely to be remembered than other items.
• Wishful thinking — the formation of beliefs and the making of decisions according to what is pleasing to imagine instead of by appeal to evidence or rationality.
• Zero-risk bias — preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk.

Biases in probability and belief

Many of these biases are often studied for how they affect business and economic decisions and how they affect experimental research.

• Ambiguity effect — the avoidance of options for which missing information makes the probability seem "unknown".
• Anchoring effect — the tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor," on a past reference or on one trait or piece of information when making decisions (also called "insufficient adjustment").
• Attentional bias — neglect of relevant data when making judgments of a correlation or association.
• Authority bias — the tendency to value an ambiguous stimulus (e.g., an art performance) according to the opinion of someone who is seen as an authority on the topic.
• Availability heuristic — estimating what is more likely by what is more available in memory, which is biased toward vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples.
• Availability cascade — a self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or "repeat something long enough and it will become true").
• Belief bias — an effect where someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.
• Clustering illusion — the tendency to see patterns where actually none exist.
• Capability bias — The tendency to believe that the closer average performance is to a target, the tighter the distribution of the data set.
• Conjunction fallacy — the tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than general ones.
• Disposition effect — the tendency to sell assets that have increased in value but hold assets that have decreased in value.
• Spielerfehlschluss — die Vorstellung, ein zufälliges Ereignis werde wahrscheinlicher, wenn es längere Zeit nicht eingetreten ist.
• Hawthorne-Effekt — Verhaltensänderung aufgrund der Teilnahme an einer Studie.
• Rückschaufehler — das Phänomen, sich nach einem Ereignis systematisch falsch an seine früheren Vorhersagen zu erinnern.
• Illusory correlation — beliefs that inaccurately suppose a relationship between a certain type of action and an effect.
• Ludic fallacy — the analysis of chance-related problems according to the belief that the unstructured randomness found in life resembles the structured randomness found in games, ignoring the non-gaussian distribution of many real-world results.
• Neglect of prior base rates effect — the tendency to neglect known odds when reevaluating odds in light of weak evidence.
• Observer-expectancy effect — when a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see also subject-expectancy effect).
• Optimism bias — the systematic tendency to be over-optimistic about the outcome of planned actions.
• Ostrich effect — ignoring an obvious (negative) situation.
• Overconfidence effect — excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of question, answers that people rate as "99% certain" turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.
• Positive outcome bias — a tendency in prediction to overestimate the probability of good things happening to them (see also wishful thinking, optimism bias, and valence effect).
• Pareidolia — vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) are perceived as significant, e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing hidden messages on records played in reverse.
• Primacy effect — the tendency to weigh initial events more than subsequent events.
• Recency effect — the tendency to weigh recent events more than earlier events (see also peak-end rule).
• Disregard of regression toward the mean — the tendency to expect extreme performance to continue.
• Selection bias — a distortion of evidence or data that arises from the way that the data are collected.
• Stereotyping — expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual.
• Subadditivity effect — the tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts.
• Subjective validation — perception that something is true if a subject's belief demands it to be true. Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences.
• Telescoping effect — the effect that recent events appear to have occurred more remotely and remote events appear to have occurred more recently.
• Zielscheibenfehler — Rückschluss von einer Häufung von Ereignissen auf einen kausalen Zusammenhang.

Social biases

Most of these biases are labeled as attributional biases.

• Actor-observer bias — the tendency for explanations of other individuals' behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see also fundamental attribution error). However, this is coupled with the opposite tendency for the self in that explanations for our own behaviors overemphasize the influence of our situation and underemphasize the influence of our own personality.
• Egocentric bias — occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint action than an outside observer would.
• Forer effect (aka Barnum Effect) — the tendency to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. For example, horoscopes.
• False consensus effect — the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them.
• Attributionsfehler — die Tendenz, den Einfluss dispositionaler Faktoren, wie Persönlichkeitseigenschaften, Einstellungen und Meinungen, auf das Verhalten anderer systematisch zu überschätzen und äußere Faktoren, zum Beispiel situative Einflüsse, zu unterschätzen
• Halo-Effekt — die Tendenz, faktisch unabhängige oder nur mäßig korrelierte Eigenschaften von Personen oder Sachen fälschlicherweise als zusammenhängend wahrzunehmen.
• Herdenverhalten — Tendenz, die Meinungen und Verhaltensweisen der Mehrheit zu übernehmen.
• Illusion of asymmetric insight — people perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them.
• Illusion of transparency — people overestimate others' ability to know them, and they also overestimate their ability to know others.
• Illusory superiority — overestimating one's desirable qualities, and underestimating undesirable qualities, relative to other people. Also known as Superiority bias (also known as "Lake Wobegon effect", "better-than-average effect", "superiority bias", or Dunning-Kruger effect).
• Ingroup bias — the tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups.
• Just-world phenomenon — the tendency for people to believe that the world is just and therefore people "get what they deserve."
• Notational bias — a form of cultural bias in which a notation induces the appearance of a nonexistent natural law.
• Outgroup homogeneity bias — individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied than members of other groups.
• Projection bias — the tendency to unconsciously assume that others share the same or similar thoughts, beliefs, values, or positions.
• Selbstwertdienliche Verzerrung — die Tendenz, eigene Erfolge im Zweifelsfall eher inneren Ursachen und eigene Misserfolge eher äußeren Ursachen zuzuschreiben.
• Selbsterfüllende Prophezeiung — eine Vorhersage, die sich deshalb erfüllt, weil derjenige oder diejenigen, die an die Prophezeiung glauben, sich – meist unbewusst – aufgrund der Prophezeiung so verhalten, dass sie sich erfüllt.
• System justification — the tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest. (See also status quo bias.)
• Trait ascription bias — the tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.
• Ultimate attribution error — Similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely to make an internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals within the group.

Memory errors

:

• Consistency bias — incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behaviour as resembling present attitudes and behaviour.
• Cryptomnesia — a form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination.
• Egocentric bias — recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g. remembering one's exam grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as being bigger than it was
• False memory — confusion of imagination with memory, or the confusion of true memories with false memories.
• Reminiscence bump — the effect that people tend to recall more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than from other lifetime periods.
• Rosy retrospection — the tendency to rate past events more positively than they had actually rated them when the event occurred.
• Self-serving bias — perceiving oneself responsible for desirable outcomes but not responsible for undesirable ones.
• Suggestibility — a form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for memory.

Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases

• Attribute substitution – making a complex, difficult judgement by unconsciously substituting an easier judgement
• Attribution theory, especially:
  • Salience
• Cognitive dissonance, and related:
  • Impression management
  • Self-perception theory
• Heuristics, including:
  • Availability heuristic – estimating what is more likely by what is more available in memory, which is biased toward vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples
  • Representativeness heuristic – judging probabilities on the basis of resemblance
  • Affect heuristic – basing a decision on an emotional reaction rather than a calculation of risks and benefits
• Adaptive bias

See also

• Attribution theory
• Black swan theory
• Groupthink
• List of common misconceptions
• List of fallacies
• List of memory biases
• List of topics related to public relations and propaganda
• Logical fallacy
• Media bias
• Psychological immune system
• Self-deception
• System justification
• Systematic bias

References

• Baron, Johnathan (2000) Thinking and deciding, 3rd edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-65030-5
• Bishop, Michael A. (2004) Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, New York: Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-516229-3
• Gilovich, Thomas (1993) How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life, New York: The Free Press, ISBN 0-02-911706-2
• Gilovich, Thomas; Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman (2002) Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-79679-2
• Greenwald, A. (1980), “The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History”, in American Psychologist, volume 35, issue 7, American Psychological Association, ISSN 0003-066X
• Kahneman, Daniel; Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky (1982) Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0-521-28414-7
• Kahneman, Daniel; Jack L. Knetsch, Richard H. Thaler (1991), “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias”, in The Journal of Economic Perspectives, volume 5, issue 1, American Economic Association, pages 193-206
• Plous, Scott (1993) The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, New York: McGraw-Hill, ISBN 0-07-050477-6
• Schacter, Daniel L. (1999), “The Seven Sins of Memory: Insights From Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience”, in American Psychologist, volume 54, issue 3, American Psychological Association, ISSN 0003-066X, pages 182-203
• Tetlock, Philip E. (2005) Expert Political Judgment: how good is it? how can we know?, Princeton: Princeton University Press, ISBN 978-0-691-12302-8
• Virine, L. (2007) Project Decisions: The Art and Science, Vienna, VA: Management Concepts, ISBN 978-1567262179