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Der Kampf um den Kokoda Track or Kokoda Trail campaign was part of the Pacific War of World War II. The campaign consisted of a series of battles fought from July 1942 to January 1943 between Japanese and Allied — primarily Australian — forces in what was then the Australian territory of New Guinea.

The Kokoda Track itself is single-file track starting just outside Port Moresby on the Coral Sea and (depending on definition) runs 60–100 kilometres through the Owen Stanley Ranges to Kokoda and the coastal lowlands beyond by the Solomon Sea. The track crosses some of the most rugged and isolated terrain in the world, reaches 2,250 metres at Mount Bellamy, and combines hot humid days with intensely cold nights, torrential rainfall and endemic tropical diseases such as malaria. The track is passable only on foot; this had extreme repercussions for logistics, the size of forces and the type of warfare conducted on the Track.

"Track" or "trail"?

Main article: Kokoda Track or Kokoda Trail?

Before World War II, paths in remote areas of New Guinea were commonly referred to as tracks. The name Kokoda Trail — which conforms with U.S. English usage — was popularised by Australian wartime reportage. Kokoda Trail is used in Australian Army battle honours. The Australian Macquarie Dictionary states that while both terms are in use, Kokoda Track "appears to be the more popular of the two" (4th ed., 2005, p. 791).

Prelude to the battle

As part of their general strategy in the Pacific, the Japanese sought to capture Port Moresby. The port would have given them a base from which they could strike at most of eastern Australia, and control of a major route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The first attempt by sea-borne amphibious invasion was thwarted by the Battle of the Coral Sea. A month later, the Battle of Midway destroyed most of the Japanese carrier fleet, and removed the possibility of major amphibious operations in the south Pacific. The Japanese now resolved to mount an overland assault across the Owen Stanley Range to capture Port Moresby.

Looking for ways to counter the Japanese advance into the South Pacific, the Supreme Allied Commander in the South West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur, decided to build up Allied forces in New Guinea as a prelude to an offensive against the main Japanese base at Rabaul. Lieutenant-General Sydney Rowell, the commander of the Allied armies' New Guinea Force, ordered the 100-strong B company of the Australian 39th (Militia) Battalion, to travel overland along the Track to the village of Kokoda. Once there, B Company was to secure the airstrip at Kokoda, in preparation for an Allied build-up along the Papuan north coast. As the militia company was securing its positions, news reached them of Japanese landings on the north coast of New Guinea.

Japanese landings and initial assault

Location of the Kokoda Track within New Guinea

Japanese troops landed on the north-east coast of Papua New Guinea in July, 1942, and established beachheads at Buna, Gona and Sanananda. (The Japanese had captured the northern part of New Guinea which lies further west earlier in the year). The 5th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force, elements of the 144th Regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hatsuo Tsukamoto, and engineering units, were unloaded from the troop transports under the overall command of engineer Colonel Yosuke Yokoyama. Colonel Yokoyama ordered Lt-Col Tsukamoto to seize the airstrip at Kokoda, and to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force along the Kokoda Track. Encountering the Australian troops deployed near Kokoda, Lt-Col Tsukamoto deployed his infantry and marines for an attack, and quickly moved inland.

First Battle of Kokoda

Skirmishing and several fierce assaults by the Japanese soldiers caused the outnumbered Australians to fall back through Kokoda. They soon re-took Kokoda but after two days a renewed Japanese offensive forced the Australians to retreat once again. Kokoda was captured by the Japanese on July 29. Although the defenders were outnumbered, under-resourced and near-starving, the resistance was such that the Japanese believed they were dealing with a force more than 6,000 strong.

Having established the strength of the defending forces, and with the strategically vital supply base and airstrip at Kokoda within his grasp, Tsukamoto deemed the track to be practicable for a full-scale overland assault against Port Moresby. The Imperial Japanese Army's 10,000-strong South Seas Force, commanded by Major-General Tomitaro Horii, based at Rabaul, was tasked with the capture of Port Moresby. Horii's force landed at the Papuan beachheads, and began moving up the Track.

Australian reinforcements

The loss of the airstrip at Kokoda forced the Australian commanders to send the other companies of the 39th Battalion plus the rest of the Militia's 30th Brigade — the 49th and 55th Battalions — over the Track, rather than reinforcing Kokoda by air. Supplies, which had previously been flown in to Kokoda by United States Army Air Forces Douglas DC-3s, would now need to be carried in by Papuan porters. Wounded soldiers could no longer be evacuated by air, and would now have to be carried out by Papuans, nicknamed fuzzy-wuzzy angels by the Australian soldiers for their hairstyle and for the tender care they provided to the sick and wounded.

Belatedly, MacArthur and the Allied land commander (and Australian Commander-in-Chief), General Thomas Blamey, realized the seriousness of the situation and ordered the Australian 7th Division, which had recently arrived in Australia from the Middle East, to embark for New Guinea. The 21st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Arnold Potts, was the first to arrive at Port Moresby. It was comprised of the 2/14th Battalion, 2/16th Battalion and the 2/27th Battalion . The 2/14th and 2/16th immediately began moving north along the Track to reinforce Maroubra Force. The 2/27th Battalion was tasked for the Kokoda Track but following the Japanese landings at Milne Bay, the 2/27th was held in Port Moresby as the divisional reserve.

Battles along the Track

Second battle of Kokoda

The first reinforcements from the 30th Brigade, led by Brigade Major Cameron, reached the Australian forces outside Kokoda, now designated Maroubra Force. Cameron had been ordered to command Maroubra Force, pending the arrival of the 39th Battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Honner. Cameron led an abortive attempt to retake Kokoda, before being forced to withdraw. On arrival, Honner took command of Maroubra Force, and withdrew further south along the Track to Isurava.

Battle of Isurava

Horii moved the first of his disembarking troops forward, a body of some 2500 soldiers, against the 39th Battalion and elements of the 49th and 53rd Militia Battalions, some 400-strong. The Japanese force made contact with the outer positions of Maroubra Force and began frontal attacks against the dug-in defenders with the aid of a mountain gun and mortars manhandled up the Track.

Japanese reconnaissance had revealed a parallel track bypassing Isurava, defended by the Australian 53rd Battalion. A Japanese battalion was sent to force this route open, and met with success, as the demoralized 53rd gave ground, retreating to the Track junction behind Isurava. Many senior officers of the 53rd were killed, leading to further demoralization in the battalion.

During the battle, the first troops of the 21st Brigade arrived, to reinforce the 39th Battalion. Potts took command of Maroubra Force, and using the screen provided by the 39th Battalion, deployed the 2/14th Battalion at Isurava, and sent the 2/16th Battalion to take over defence of the alternate track from the retreating 53rd Battalion. By the time the 2/14th Battalion had deployed, the Japanese were still able to field a force some 5,000 strong, and therefore outnumbered the Australians by at least five-to-one.

Japanese tactics were little-changed from the campaign through Malaya — pin the enemy in place with suicidal frontal attacks, while feeling for the flanks, with a view to cutting off enemy forces from the rear. However, Horii was on a strict timetable; any delays feeling for flanks meant the gradual debilitation of his force from disease and starvation. As a result, Maroubra Force endured four days of violent frontal attacks. During the fighting, the 39th Battalion was forced to stay on instead of being relieved, as the Japanese threatened several times to break through the 2/14ths perimeter.

On August 29, Private Bruce Kingsbury of the 2/14th made a unique individual contribution to the campaign, and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross as a result. His citation read, in part:

Private Kingsbury, who was one of the few survivors of a platoon which had been overrun ... immediately volunteered to join a different platoon which had been ordered to counterattack. He rushed forward, firing the Bren gun from his hip through terrific machine-gun fire, and succeeded in clearing a path through the enemy. Continuing to sweep enemy positions with his fire, and inflicting an extremely high number of casualties upon them, Private Kingsbury was then seen to fall to the ground, shot dead by the bullet from a sniper hiding in the wood.

Eyewitnesses said that Kingsbury's actions had a profound effect on the Japanese, halting their momentum.

However, Australian casualties mounted, and ammunition ran low. The Japanese threatened to make a breakthrough on the alternate track, and Horii had now deployed several companies on the flanks and near the rear of the 2/14th and 39th Battalions, threatening an encirclement. Outnumbered, Maroubra Force withdrew towards Nauro and Menari. Potts relieved the exhausted 39th Battalion and the shattered 49th and 53rd; the malaria-wracked survivors made their way back to Port Moresby on foot, or were carried by Papuan stretcher parties.

Isurava to Brigade Hill

Retreating soldiers, Papuan porters and wounded immediately flooded the Track, causing it to become a sea of mud in parts. However, no wounded were left behind — Japanese patrols routinely mutilated and executed any wounded found; sometimes using the corpses as bait, to draw Australian soldiers into ambushes.

No suitable defensive terrain existed between Isurava and a feature known as Mission Ridge, which was south of Nauro and Myola. As a result, Brigadier Potts and Maroubra force retreated back through Menari, mounting small delaying actions where possible.

Myola to that time had been used as a supply dump, a cleared patch of ground allowing supply drops by the U.S. Army Air Force Douglas DC-3 "biscuit bombers". Allen, commanding the 7th Division, asked Potts when offensive actions would be resumed, now that air-drops were ensuring a regular, if sparse and intermittent flow of supplies. Potts in turn enquired after his 2/27th Battalion, denied him by Allen, in view of the situation at Milne Bay. Pressured by Rowell and Blamey, Allen ordered Potts to hold Myola as a forward supply base, and to gather sufficient supplies for an offensive against the Japanese advance.

Allen's orders were stunningly ignorant of the true situation facing Maroubra Force, but Potts knew only too well the overwhelming superiority of numbers fielded against him. Threatened with an outflanking maneuver through a loop of the Track, and insufficient terrain near Myola suitable for a set-piece defence, Potts was forced to retreat through Myola, destroying the supply base behind him.

Battle of Brigade Hill

Soldiers of the 39th Battalion following their relief in September 1942

Maroubra Force withdrew to the next defensible strong point on the Track, a feature known as Mission Ridge. Following the containment of the Japanese at Milne Bay, Major General Allen finally released the 2/27th Battalion from the divisional reserve at Port Moresby. After advancing along the Track from Port Moresby, the 2/27th Battalion finally joined Maroubra Force at Mission Ridge, and Brigadier Potts was finally able to commit his entire brigade to the battle.

Taking up positions on a hilltop straddling the Track, which later became known as "Brigade Hill", Maroubra Force awaited the Japanese advance. The usual Japanese frontal attacks began soon after, upon the Australian leading elements. However, the Japanese launched a strong flank attack, aimed at cutting off the lead elements from the rest of Maroubra Force. The flank attack cut Maroubra Force in two, separating the brigade headquarters staff from the three battalions. With Brigade HQ about to be overrun, Brigadier Potts and the rear elements of Maroubra Force were forced to retreat back along the Track to the village of Menari.

When it became clear that they were in danger of being cut-off and destroyed, the remaining soldiers of all three Australian battalions immediately left the Track and "went bush" via an alternate track to the village of Menari. The 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions managed to re-unite with Brigadier Potts and 21st Brigade headquarters at Menari, but the 2/27th Battalion was unable to reach Menari before the rest of the brigade was again forced to retreat by the advancing Japanese. The 2/27th, along with wounded from the other battalions, were forced to follow paths parallel to the main Track, eventually making their way back to Ioribaiwa, and thence to Imita Ridge. Elements of the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions accompanying Potts later managed to regroup for the defence of Imita Ridge, but the 2/27th only managed to regroup much later, after the Japanese retreat began. Controversy surrounds some of reports of the actions taken by the three Australian battalions and their commanders, but the end result of the action was the shattering of Maroubra Force.

The defeat of the 21st Brigade at Brigade Hill finally ended Maroubra Force's defence of the Kokoda Track as a cohesive unit, and was a decisive victory for the Japanese. The defeat was one of many factors leading later to the "running rabbits" incident at base camp at Koitaki.

General Thomas Blamey ordered Brigadier Potts to immediately report to Port Moresby "for consultations", replacing him as Maroubra Force commander, with Brigadier Selwyn Porter.

Ioribaiwa and Imita Ridge

Upon reaching Ioribaiwa, the lead Japanese elements began to celebrate - from their vantage point on the hills around Ioribaiwa, the Japanese soldiers could see the lights of Port Moresby and the Coral Sea beyond. However, Major-General Horii ordered his troops to dig in on the ridgeline. It was becoming clear to General Horii that the logistics trail along the Track from Buna was close to complete collapse. No new supplies had reached the forward Japanese battalions for some days now, and the few meagre supplies captured from the Australians were insufficient for a new offensive. The foodstuffs taken from the former Australian supply dump at Myola had proved to be contaminated, and hundreds of Japanese soldiers were now succumbing to dysentery as a result, while others were showing the advanced stages of starvation.

Meanwhile, the worn-out soldiers of Maroubra Force were relieved by the 25th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Ken Eather, and the 16th Brigade (of the Australian 6th Division), commanded by Brigadier John Lloyd. The Australian brigades dug in at Imita Ridge, near the start of the Kokoda Track outside Port Moresby, and were supported by an artillery battery of 25 pounders, which had been forcibly brought up the Track.

At this time, Major-General Horii received orders from the Japanese commander at Rabaul - due to the ongoing commitments of the Battle of Guadalcanal, no more reinforcements could be spared for the Kokoda Track offensive, and General Horii was to withdraw to the Buna-Gona beachheads. The order to withdraw was given, and the Japanese began to rapidly move back towards Kokoda.

Australian counter-offensive

With two Australian brigades committed to action on the Track, 7th Division commander Major-General Arthur "Tubby" Allen now took operational command of operations on the Kokoda Track. Each brigade in turn kept contact with the withdrawing Japanese until resistance began, just south of Kokoda, and later to the west. Unsatisfied with the speed of his advance, General Blamey relieved Major-General Allen of command, and replaced him with Major-General George Vasey of the Australian 6th Division.

Several grisly discoveries by advancing Australian troops starkly illustrated the logistical nightmare of the Track — Japanese corpses were often found with no sign of external trauma, having died from typhoid and dysentery, and several corpses of Australian soldiers were found to have had body parts removed, a result of the starving Japanese resorting to cannibalism.

In order to try to cut off the Japanese at the Kumusi River crossings, the United States 126th Regiment of the 32nd Division set off on an advance from Port Moresby along tracks parallel to the Kokoda Track. However, the Japanese withdrawal was more rapid than expected, and the 126th Regiment emerged near the Gona-Buna beachheads without encountering the Japanese. Unfortunately, tropical diseases and exhaustion took their toll on the 126th, which lost a significant part of its strength for the subsequent Battle of Buna-Gona.

In a dramatic and bizarre turn of events, Major-General Horii disappeared, presumed drowned, while withdrawing with his troops across the Kumusi River, towards the beachheads. The fierce current of the river swept away a horse on which he was riding; instead, Horii opted to float down the Kumusi River in a canoe with other senior officers, in order to quickly get back to Buna and organize the beachhead defences. The canoe was floated down to the river mouth, but Horii and his staff were swept out to sea in a freak squall. None were ever seen again.

Aftermath

The "running rabbits" incident

After the fighting, withdrawal, and the relief of the 21st Brigade by the 25th Brigade, Blamey visited the remnants of Maroubra Force near base camp, outside Port Moresby. He relieved Potts of his command, citing Pott's failure to hold back the Japanese, despite commanding "superior forces" and, despite explicit orders to the contrary, Pott's failure to launch an offensive to re-take Kokoda. Blamey replaced Potts with Brigadier Ivan Dougherty, who was to command 21st Brigade until the end of the war.

Later, Blamey addressed the men of the 21st Brigade. Drawn up to attention on the parade ground to listen to Blamey's speech, the men of Maroubra Force expected congratulations for their heroic effort in holding back the Japanese. However, instead of being praised for their efforts they soon realized not long into Blameys speech, they were being criticized for the actions. He informed them that they had been "beaten" by inferior forces, and that "no soldier should be afraid to die". "Remember," Blamey was reported as saying, "it's the rabbit who runs who gets shot, not the man holding the gun." There was an immediate wave of murmurs and restlessness among the soldiers. Officers and senior NCOs managed to quiet the restive soldiers, and to prevent a mutiny. Later that day, during the march-past parade, many disobeyed the "eyes-right" order. In a later letter to his wife, an enraged Brigadier Potts swore to "fry his [Blamey's] soul" for Blamey's act. Blamey subsequently visited Australian wounded in the camp hospital. It is reported that nurses had smuggled in lettuce leaves, which wounded soldiers nibbled in front of Blamey, wrinkling their noses and whispering "run, rabbit, run!"

Subsequent events

The Japanese withdrew within their formidable defences around the Buna-Gona beachheads, reinforced by fresh Japanese units from Rabaul. A joint Australian-United States Army operation was launched to crush the Japanese beachheads, in the Battle of Buna-Gona.

Following the conclusion of the action at Buna and Gona, about 30 remaining members of the 39th Battalion were airlifted out of the front line and the battalion was dissolved, to the regret of some members.

Allied operations against Japanese forces in New Guinea continued into 1945.

Significance for Australia

While the Gallipoli Campaign of World War I was Australia's first military test as a new nation, the Kokoda and subsequent New Guinea campaign was the first time that Australia's security had been threatened directly. Given that at the time, Papua New Guinea was an Australian Protectorate, Kokoda was also the first time that Australians fought and died repelling an invader on Australian soil. It was also the first time that Australia had fought without the material presence or support of the United Kingdom.

The dire peril facing Australia during the South Pacific and New Guinea campaigns underlined Australia's security problems, and would later lead to the populate-or-perish post-war mass immigration programme, and the signing of the ANZUS defence treaty.

Ralph Honner summed up the magnitude of the achievement, when he described the Battle of Isurava as "Australia's Thermopylae". If the Battle of Gallipoli forged an "ANZAC spirit", then Kokoda perhaps surpassed that spirit or even saved it, since the Australian people may have faced invasion, had the campaign been lost.

References

• Brune, Peter A Bastard of a Place : The Australians in Papua, Allen & Unwin 2003, ISBN 1-74114-403-5
• Edgar, Bill Warrior of Kokoda: A biography of Brigadier Arnold Potts, Allen & Unwin 1999, ISBN 1-86448-908-1
• FitzSimons, Peter Kokoda, Hodder Headline Australia 2005, ISBN 0-7336-1962-2

Further reading

• Ham, Paul. Kokoda.
• McCarthy, Dudley South-West Pacific Area - First Year (Official History of Australia in the Second World War)

See also

• 39th Battalion

External links

• Kokoda Campaign